ARTICLES of INTEREST Special Report - Depleted Uranium What is Depleted Uranium? The DOD - Report of Lies WISE Depleted Uranium Project Uranium Toxicity Citizen Alert Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Commission NWFZ - Links Crosswynd - Out There Television VISIT 'BEN FRANK" Saving America - NOW! Truth in Pictures

Depleted Uranium is rapidly becoming known throughout the world as the most deadly product or weapon of mass destruction ever perpetuated on human-kind and this planet. It has been used on nations, their people, land, water, air and so forth and there is no cure. One pound of DU has a half-life of 450 billion years. Tons have been used in open warfare since 1988. This is the cause of the Gulf War Syndrome and there is no escape. Is it being stored in your state and in your neighborhood? Have you been exposed?        Presented here is an in depth view of what is not only killing the people of our world...it is killing our world.        We, Human-beings, have a duty and a responsibility to insure that those who are responsible for this atrocity and in positions of supposed power, whether it be government, military, corporation, medical and educational do not use their positions to mislead and lie to the world at large about the truths and facts on this deadly subject .        The Western Shoshone Nation of Newe Sogobia which is surrounded by the State of Nevada has at least four (4) Depleted Uranium storage facilities on their lands and at least one known uphill of the Paiute Reservation at Pyramid Lake. This is of great concern considering that they have never been informed by the Department of Interior, the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, the Bureau of Land Management or any other department that these sites were being placed on their lands...and especially so close to human habitat.        This being the case, how many other places within the United States, aside from Native American lands have those responsible secretly been storing these materials...right out in the open? Military grade nuclear waste, such as this, cannot be buried for at least 50 years. Why? It is considered too hot - literally.        Most, if not all, of this Depleted Uranium is designated for places like Yucca Mountain, Nevada. (Native American Spiritual Lands). In order for it to get there it must travel across the country by road and rail. In other words, it must travel through everyone's neighborhood.        You will learn herein and through associated links that there are great and numerous problems with the moving and storage of these materials. How are we to trust the safe passage of Spent Nuclear Waste? We can't.        Perhaps, once you've read and learned the details of this situation, you may become aware that we must all unify our energies and efforts to put hard pressure on those who play active rolls in these matters and accept nothing short of demanding a total cease and desist on these projects with no compromises.        What are we going to do about it? Educate, Inform. Unify. Stand and be heard. This is a world issue. It is about the survival of humans everywhere. It crosses all borders, all governments, all religions and all political arguments...it is about the survival of our entire planet...now and into the future.        This is not about another environmental group attacking the already heated arguments in regards to destroying the planet for the sake of advancing civilization and its greedy addiction to manufacturing a lot of stuff people don't really need and finding areas to dump the waste from it - and yet, it is an environmental group known as human-beings trying to save their entire planet from such mindsets.        Ask yourself, is it really worth it to destroy the entire planet just so one nation, one political concept, one religion, one corporation, one military can have total control over all the others? It's not logical, not practical, it's inhuman and in the long run...we all die and no one wins. End of subject.        Please be aware that many of the links associated with this subject that appear here for your further reading, information and research are not dependable. When conducting the primary research on this subject, as presented here, most of these links worked perfectly. However, this subject in itself, has proven to be too controversial for those involved and in an effort to cover it up even more have been utilizing such marvelous technological instruments such as web-internet coding to redirect many of these links to 404 errors, DNS domains and other no where places. All of our links are left in place as we have found them so you may find out on your own where these go and maybe figure out a way to get around them. With this in mind you may understand why we have placed much of that pulled and covered content here so that it could not be covered up...at least until they find these pages also. Therefore, we would like to suggest that you print this material for your own archives in an ongoing effort to prevent it from being lost forever. Someday, it may be up to you to re-post it. If they have chosen to site "national security" ... so have we, along with human and planetary security and accountability. The images on this page are just a mere peek at what is being stored around our nation. (Coming to a neighborhood near you!) (A Breech? Look at all that lovely rust.) (Notice the discoloration on these cylinders? Also notice the power lines directly above the yard.)

Approximately 704,000 metric tons of depleted UF6 is stored in about 57,600 steel cylinders that hold 9 - 12 metric tons of depleted UF6. The cylinders are stored in large outdoor areas called "cylinder yards." A program of regular surveillance and maintenance activities assures the safety of continued cylinder storage. (This is not true. The numbers are much higher and the program of regular surveillance and maintenance activities assures their safety is nothing short of a joke.) Transportation of Depleted Uranium Materials in Support of the Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Program Issues associated with transport of depleted UF6 cylinders and conversion products. Conversion Plan Transportation Requirements The DOE has prepared two Environmental Impact Statements (EISs) for the proposal to build and operate depleted uranium hexafluoride (UF6) conversion facilities at its Portsmouth and Paducah gaseous diffusion plant sites, pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The proposed action calls for transporting the cylinder at ETTP to Portsmouth for conversion. The transportation of depleted UF6 cylinders and of the depleted uranium conversion products following conversion was addressed in the EISs. Shipment of Radioactive Materials Under the Department of Transportation Act of 1966, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) has regulatory responsibility for safety in transportation of all hazardous materials, including radioactive material. DOT developed a single a set of safety standards that assured that properly prepared shipments of hazardous materials would be acceptable for transport by all modes (rail, highway, air, and water). These standards are set forth primarily in DOT's Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR) located in 49 CFR Parts 100 - 178. Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) also has responsibility for safety in the transport of radioactive materials. Due to the overlap in statutory authorities of the NRC and DOT, the two agencies have a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with regard to regulation of the transport of radioactive material. Consistent with the MOU, the NRC has promulgated, in 10 CFR Part 71, shipping requirements for radioactive materials. The primary regulatory approach used by DOT and NRC for ensuring safety during transportation of radioactive materials is by specifying standards for the proper packaging of such materials. Packaging for transporting radioactive materials must be designed, constructed, and maintained to ensure that they will contain and shield their contents during normal transportation. The type of packaging used is determined by the radioactive hazard associated with the packaged material. The hazard is determined by the characteristics of the specific radioactive material and its physical form (e.g., solid, liquid, or gas). The regulations also specify many requirements for labeling, marking, training, and administrative controls. The shipment of radioactive materials may take place by truck, rail, or barge. Federal regulations do not place route restrictions on the movement of depleted UF6 cylinders or depleted uranium on United States highways or railroads. It should be noted that the nuclear properties of depleted uranium are such that the occurrence of a nuclear criticality (i.e., a nuclear chain reaction) is not a concern, regardless of the amount of depleted uranium present. However, criticality is a concern for the handling, packaging, and shipping of enriched uranium. For enriched uranium, criticality control is accomplished by employing, individually or collectively, specific limits on uranium-235 enrichment, mass, volume, geometry, moderation, and spacing for each type of package. The amount of uranium that may be contained in an individual package and the total number of packages that may be transported together are determined by the nuclear properties of the enriched uranium. Shipment of Depleted UF6 Cylinders UF6 has been transported safely for more than 40 years. Specific requirements exist for the shipment of UF6 cylinders. Among other things, UF6 cylinders must be designed, fabricated, inspected, tested, and marked in accordance with the version of American National Standard N14.1, "Uranium Hexafluoride - Packaging for Transport" that was in effect at the time the cylinder was manufactured. Although a detailed discussion of depleted UF6 transportation regulations is not included here, three requirements are particularly important relative to depleted UF6 cylinder shipments: (1) cylinders must be filled to less than 62% of the certified volumetric capacity (the fill-limit was reduced to 62% from 64% around 1987); (2) the pressure within cylinders must be less than 14.8 psia; and (3) cylinders must be free of cracks, excessive distortion, bent or broken valves or plugs, and broken or torn stiffening rings or skirts, and must not have shell thicknesses that have decreased below a specified minimum value. Cylinders not meeting these requirements are often referred to as substandard or noncompliant. Although the exact number is not yet known, preliminary reports suggest that many of the cylinders at ETTP will not meet the DOT transportation requirements. Three options exist for shipping these noncompliant cylinders: � The UF6 contents could be transferred from noncompliant cylinders into new or compliant cylinders. � An exemption could be obtained from the DOT, allowing the UF6 cylinder to be transported either "as is" or following repairs. The primary finding that DOT must make to justify granting an application for an exemption is that the proposed alternative will achieve a level of safety that either: (1) is at least equal to the level of safety required by the otherwise applicable regulation; or, (2) if the otherwise applicable regulations do not establish a required level of safety, is consistent with the public interest and will adequately protect against the risks to life and property inherent in the transportation of hazardous materials in commerce. � Noncompliant cylinders could be shipped in an "overpack." In this case, the shipper would have to obtain an exemption from DOT allowing the existing cylinder, regardless of its condition, to be transported if it is placed into a metal overpack. The metal overpack would have to be specially designed. Furthermore, DOT would have to determine that, if the overpack is fabricated, inspected, and marked according to its design, the resulting packaging (including the cylinder and the overpack) would have a level of safety at least equal to the level of safety required for a new UF6 cylinder. Shipment of Depleted Uranium Conversion Products The depleted uranium conversion product will be shipped as low specific activity, group I, (LSA-I) material. All LSA materials have a characteristic of presenting limited radiation hazard, because of their relatively low concentration of radioactivity. Evaluation of Transportation Risks The EISs for the conversion project include a detailed evaluation of the risks associated with the transportation of the depleted uranium materials. This assessment includes the risks to both workers and members of the public during normal transportation conditions and hypothetical accidents. Depleted UF6 Storage Safety Continued cylinder storage is safe if the current surveillance and maintenance activities are continued. (...and " IF " not?...) Potential Hazards of Cylinder Storage The advanced age of some of the steel cylinders in which the depleted UF6 is contained, and the way in which the cylinders were stored (sometimes too close together to permit inspection, and sometimes in direct contact with the ground, due to settlement of cylinders, leading to enhanced cylinder corrosion) have created a potential environmental and safety hazard. While depleted UF6 does not present as significant a radiological hazard as other radioactive materials, it is a potential chemical hazard if not properly managed. (Nice of them to at least admit this much.) Concerns Raised about Depleted UF6 Storage at Portsmouth In October 1992, the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA) issued a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Notice of Violation to the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant. The Notice of Violation stated that the OEPA had determined depleted UF6 to be a solid waste, and that the Department had violated Ohio laws and regulations by not evaluating whether such waste was hazardous. The Department differed with this assessment, and in February 1998, reached an agreement with OEPA, which defers RCRA characterization of depleted UF6 stored at the Portsmouth Plant until 2008, as long as the Department complies with a Depleted UF6 Management Plan as agreed to by OEPA and makes good faith efforts to evaluate potential use or reuse of the depleted UF6. Concerns Raised about Depleted UF6 Storage at ETTP The State of Tennessee raised nearly identical RCRA issues in 1997 regarding depleted UF6 stored at the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) near Oak Ridge. A negotiated settlement resulted in a consent order issued by the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation on February 8, 1999. Among other things, the order requires conversion of all depleted UF6 stored at the ETTP, or removal of the storage cylinders from the State by December 31, 2009. (How do they plan to convert these materials and where are they going to move them too? - Yucca Mountain, Nevada?) The PEIS and Cylinder Management Program Following the OEPA Notice of Violation in 1992, the Department took the initiative to re-evaluate its long-term strategy for managing the DUF6 inventory. In 1994, work began on the Program-matic Environmental Impact Statement for Alternative Strategies for the Long-Term Management and Use of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride <../../../guide/peis/index.cfm> (DOE/EIS-0269, April 1999). In 1995, the Department also began an aggressive program to better manage the aging depleted UF6 cylinders. In part, this program responded to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 95?1, Safety of Cylinders Containing Depleted Uranium, which DOE fully accepted. Included were more rigorous and frequent inspections, painting and refurbishing of cylinders, and construction of concrete-pad cylinder yards. The results of the analysis in the PEIS indicated that continued cylinder storage is safe if the current surveillance and maintenance activities are continued. The Cylinder Management program's implementation has been successful, and as a result, on December 16, 1999, the DNFSB closed out Recommendation 95-1. Depleted UF6 Cylinder Leakage A small number of cylinders have leaked over the last 40 years; leaking cylinders are repaired, and material that leaks onto the ground is removed. (Where do they remove these materials too? What about the personnel that handles this material? Do they remove them too?) Chemical Reactions During Leakage If a cylinder leak (breach) occurs and the depleted UF6 is exposed to water vapor in the air, uranyl fluoride (UO2F2) and hydrogen fluoride (HF) are formed. The uranyl fluoride is a solid that plugs the leak, limiting further escape of depleted UF6. Release of the hydrogen fluoride gas to the atmosphere is also slowed by the plug formation. (They know this because it has happened more than once...in this country...in your neighborhood.) Historical Information about Leaks Ten depleted UF6 cylinders have been breached (mainly from cylinder wall cracks) over the past 40 years: most of the breaches were due to corrosion around dents caused by mishandling, with the others due to corrosion around welding defects or from external corrosion alone. After the breaches were discovered, the material that leaked onto the ground was removed, and the cylinders were repaired or the UF6 was transferred to new cylinders. The cylinder yard workers and the environment around the cylinder yards are constantly monitored for potential radiation and chemical exposures and appropriate actions are taken if higher-than-expected readings are obtained from monitoring equipment. (Again, they admit there is problems and will be more as this has been going on for over 40 years. They want to transport this stuff throughout our country, through your neighborhood on its way to some place like Yucca Mountain.) Leak Repair Procedures When a valve leak is detected, the valve is replaced. When cylinder wall corrosion or leakage is detected, the cylinder is repaired with a patch, followed by a welded steel repair. NOTE: (Where is the leaked material moved to and how is it handled and contained? (No mention of this.) Cylinder Surveillance and Maintenance DOE has a Cylinder Management program in place to inspect and maintain depleted UF6 cylinders, and to improve their storage conditions. Background Since 1990, DOE has conducted a program of cylinder inspections, recoatings, and relocations to assure that depleted UF6 is safely stored pending its ultimate disposition. The program has so far been largely focused on the ongoing surveillance and maintenance of the cylinders containing depleted UF6. In 1995, the Department began an aggressive program to better manage the aging depleted UF6 cylinders. In part, this program responded to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 95-1, Safety of Cylinders Containing Depleted Uranium, which DOE fully accepted. Included were more rigorous and frequent inspections, painting and refurbishing of cylinders, and construction of concrete-pad cylinder yards. The results of the analysis in the PEIS indicated that continued cylinder storage is safe if the current surveillance and maintenance activities are continued. The Cylinder Management program's implementation has been successful, and as a result, on December 16, 1999, the DNFSB closed out Recommendation 95-1. Surveillance and Maintenance Program Duration It will take decades to convert the depleted UF6 in the inventory to a more stable chemical form. As a result, the Department intends to continue surveillance and maintenance of the depleted UF6 cylinders currently in storage. Surveillance and Maintenance Program Activities The day to day management of the depleted UF6 cylinders includes actions designed to cost effectively improve their storage conditions, such as: � Performing regular inspections and general maintenance of cylinders and storage yards; � Restacking and respacing the cylinders to improve drainage and to allow for more thorough inspections; � Repainting ends of skirted cylinders and repainting cylinder bodies as needed to arrest corrosion; and � Constructing new concrete cylinder storage yards and reconditioning existing yards from gravel to concrete to improve storage conditions. The above information is compiled from: Argonne National Laboratory - January 2006 About Argonne Argonne National Laboratory administers this web site for The U.S. DOE Office of Environmental Management. Responsibilities The Depleted UF6 Management Program Information Network web site is administered by the Environmental Assessment Division of Argonne National Laboratory for the United States Department of Energy (DOE) , Office of Environmental Management (EM) . EM is responsible for preparation of the Depleted UF6 Conversion Facility EISs. Argonne is assisting EM in preparation of the EISs. About the Office of Environmental Management (EM) In 1989, the Department of Energy created the Office of Environmental Management (EM) to mitigate the risks and hazards posed by the legacy of nuclear weapons production and research. Although the nation continues to maintain an arsenal of nuclear weapons, as well as some production capability, the United States has embarked on new missions. The most ambitious and far ranging of these missions is dealing with the environmental legacy of the Cold War. Like most industrial and manufacturing operations, the nuclear complex has generated waste, pollution, and contamination. However, many problems posed by its operations are unique. They include unprecedented amounts of contaminated waste, water, and soil, and a vast number of contaminated structures that will remain radioactive for thousands of years. About Argonne National Laboratory Argonne National Laboratory is one of the U.S. Department of Energy's largest research centers. It is also the nation's first national laboratory, chartered in 1946. Today, the laboratory has more than 4,000 employees, including about 1,400 scientists and engineers, of whom about 700 hold doctorate degrees. The Environmental Assessment Division of Argonne National Laboratory conducts applied research, assessment, and technology development in the following areas: risk and waste management; natural resource systems and integrated assessments; restoration, compliance, and pollution prevention; and environmental policy analysis and planning. Most of these efforts support federal agencies that have responsibilities for energy development and use, natural resource management, or national defense. For More Information: Contact the Depleted UF6 Webmaster: Robert Sullivan Environmental Assessment Division Argonne National Laboratory Argonne, IL 60439 (630)252-6182 duf6webmaster@anl.gov In January 2001, news media in many parts of the world carried reports that postulated links between NATO's use of Depleted Uranium ammunition in Kosovo and Bosnia with allegedly higher incidences of leukemia, other cancers, and other negative health effects said to be occuring among NATO troops who had served in those areas and among local civilian populations. Although a very large body of existing scientific and medical research clearly established that such a link between Depleted Uranium ammunition and the reported illnesses was extremely unlikely, NATO Secretary General George Robertson immediately established an Ad Hoc Committee on Depleted Uranium to serve as a clearing house for information to be shared among interested nations. To date, the scientific and medical research continues to disprove any link between Depleted Uranium and the reported negative health effects. Furthermore, the present evidence strongly suggests that NATO troops serving in the Balkans are not suffering negative health effects different from those suffered by their colleagues who have not served in the Balkans. Nevertheless, NATO is not complacent about this matter, and will continue to share information about this issue. Review Depleted uranium: an overview of its properties and health effects S. Shawky1 1Department of Community Medicine and Primary Health Care, College of Medicine and Allied Health Sciences, King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Volume 8, No. 2&3 , March 2002. SUMMARY There has been much debate about the use of depleted uranium in the Gulf War and its health effects on United States and European war veterans. However, studies on the impact of this radioactive substance on the residents of the surrounding Gulf region are far from adequate. Depleted uranium introduces large quantities of radioactive material that is hazardous to biological organisms, continues to decay for millennia and is able to travel tens of kilometres in air. If depleted uranium were used in the Gulf War, its impact on the health of people in the area would have been considerable. This review of depleted uranium, its origin, properties, uses and effects on the human environment and health aims to trigger further research on this subject. Introduction Many debates about the use of depleted uranium in the Gulf War have been held in industrialized countries. Some claim that depleted uranium was used extensively in place of tungsten for ordnance by the United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) forces [1,2]. It has been suggested that at least 320 tons of depleted uranium were used during the war and much of that was converted at high temperatures into an aerosol of minute insoluble particles of uranium oxide [1]. The fact that depleted uranium was detected in the urine of Gulf War veterans seven to eight years after the war is substantial evidence of long-term internal contamination and tissue storage of this substance [1,3,4]. For some years after the Gulf War, many US and European veterans deployed in the region during the war complained of vague incapacitating symptoms that have been termed �Gulf War syndrome� [5,6]. The US Department of Defense treated this illness as �post-traumatic stress disorder� and advised military doctors to treat it with muscle relaxants and sleeping pills while ordering a mental illness assessment [1]. Arguments about the issue have continued for years, some authors describing it as a myth invented by the media [7], others documenting the symptoms reported by the veterans. These symptoms were multiple, consisting mainly of chronic fatigue, headache, muscle and joint pain, sleep disturbances, bladder dysfunction, sweating disturbances, skin manifestations, menstrual disorders, as well as neurological, psychological, respiratory, gastrointestinal and cardiac symptoms [5,6,8]. Over time, the focus shifted to more serious health risks and a number of dangerous conditions became linked to depleted uranium exposure. These included cancers of different types, renal diseases, as well as congenital anomalies and perinatal deaths among the neonates of veterans [3,9�14]. These health concerns triggered an explosion of interest in the subject as the affected veterans started to campaign for more information about the relationship between their illnesses and exposure to depleted uranium. If the Gulf War veterans who were temporarily stationed in the region were indeed victims of depleted uranium, what could have been the impact of this substance on the health of the residents of the region and surrounding countries? Most studies from Iraq have concentrated on the impact of the United Nations� sanctions against Iraq on nutritional deficiencies and on children�s health. A few studies in the Gulf countries have noted an increased incidence of abortion and prenatal and infant mortality since the Gulf War [15�17], but no adequate in-depth research has been performed on the link between the war and serious health conditions. Many issues concerning the effect of depleted uranium on the health of the residents of the war countries and the surrounding regions remain unexplored. This review of depleted uranium�its origin, properties, uses and impact on the human environment and health�aims to trigger further research on the subject. Internet and MEDLINE searches were performed to extract information on depleted uranium and its health effects. Information was mainly taken from published research on depleted uranium in general and from the Gulf War in particular. Origin of depleted uranium [1,18,19] Natural uranium is the heaviest naturally occurring element on earth. It is widely distributed in the earth�s crust but is concentrated in certain rock formations. Natural uranium has both radioactive and fissive properties and is known to be the deadliest metal on earth. Radioactivity is caused by unstable atoms exploding microscopically to form a series of new substances called �decay products�, emitting energy in the form of alpha and beta particles and gamma rays. The fission process requires highly sophisticated technology to bombard uranium atoms with neutrons, splitting them into two or three pieces and releasing a high degree of energy and more neutrons with great force. This splits more atoms and starts a chain reaction, producing substances called �fission products�. Radioactivity and fissionability are two completely different processes and release different products. Radioactivity is not triggered and so cannot be controlled, whereas fission can be started, stopped, slowed or speeded. It is fission that allows uranium to be used in nuclear electricity generation and in nuclear weapons. Natural uranium occurs in soil at about 1 to 3 parts per million whereas in uranium ore it is about 1000 times more concentrated, reaching about 0.05% to 0.20% of the total weight. Natural uranium is a blend of uranium-235 (U-235) and uranium-238 (U-238). The U-235 is the fissionable part and can be used directly but it is rare and constitutes only 1% of natural uranium. Thus at a uranium enrichment plant, the concentration of U-235 is increased by discarding some U-238. This cast-off uranium, which is almost 100% uranium (mainly U-238), is called depleted uranium. Radioactive decay products of depleted uranium [1,18,20] Depleted uranium is thus a nuclear waste by-product of uranium enrichment and has the same properties as metallic natural uranium. As the concentration of uranium in depleted uranium is much higher than in its natural state, depleted uranium is more radioactive than natural uranium. Figure 1 shows the radioactive decay products of depleted uranium, their half-lives and the type of energy emitted (alpha or beta particles or gamma rays). It can be seen that radium is one of the decay products of U-238. Radium disintegrates into radon gas that in turn decays into the extremely dangerous �radon daughters� or �radon progeny�, of which there are about half a dozen radioactive materials including polonium, the most toxic of all radon daughters. Finally, this progression ends with lead, which is a stable highly toxic substance. Figure 2 shows the radioactive decay products of the radon progeny. The very long half-life of U-238 means that depleted uranium remains radioactive for billions of years and over these periods will continue to produce radioactive decay products. Thus, depleted uranium becomes more radioactive over the centuries and millennia because the decay products accumulate. Figure 1 = Radioactive decay products of depleted uranium, their half lives (shown in brackets) and type of energy emitted: Figure 2 = Radioactive decay products of the radon progeny, their half lives (shown in brackets) and type of energy emitted: alpha or beta particles or gamma rays: Uses of depleted uranium [1,19,20] Depleted uranium has several military and peacetime uses. In military settings it can be used to breed plutonium, a powerful nuclear explosive; to double the explosive power of a hydrogen bomb; to coat conventional bullets and shells to improve their armour-piercing capabilities; and to provide armour-plating to tanks and other vehicles. The peacetime uses include: counterweights in aeroplanes; shields against radiation in medical radiotherapy units; and transport of radioactive isotopes. Environmental pollution with depleted uranium [1,20,21] Depleted uranium ignites at high temperatures, producing uranium oxide particles (UO2 and UO3) that are insoluble in water. The particles resist gravity and are able to travel tens of kilometres in air. Once on the ground, they can be resuspended and continue travelling when the soil or sand is disturbed by motion or wind. They contaminate the soil, ground water and river systems. Radioactive materials can also be carried long distances in the bodies of animals, fish, birds and insects. Thus, depleted uranium seeps into water, food and air and introduces into the human environment very large quantities of long-lasting radioactive materials, all of which are hazardous to biological organisms. Human exposure to depleted uranium [18�20] Human exposure to depleted uranium can be external or internal. External exposure occurs through proximity to depleted uranium metal or through contact with dust or shrapnel following an explosion or impact. Internal exposure occurs by ingestion of food and water contaminated with depleted uranium, as well as inhalation of depleted uranium that has been deposited in the environment or resuspended in the atmosphere by wind or other disturbances. In the military environment, humans can be exposed to radiation through wounds, if these are caused by the impact of depleted uranium projectiles or armour. Health hazards of depleted uranium [1,17�20] Depleted uranium and its decay products are extremely dangerous and remain radioactive even inside the human body. During the radioactive decay, tiny electrically charged alpha and beta particles and gamma rays are emitted that travel very fast. Some radioactive materials are alpha emitters and others are beta emitters. An alpha particle is made up of two protons and two neutrons whereas a beta particle is made up of a single electron. The gamma rays are not material particles but a form of pure energy travelling at the speed of light. Gamma rays penetrate very fast through the soft tissues. Beta particles have less penetrating power, travelling less than two centimetres in soft tissue. Alpha particles are the weakest, travelling just a few microns in soft tissue (equivalent to a few cell diameters). Thus, outside the body, alpha emitters are the least harmful because alpha particles are hardly able to penetrate the outer layer of the epidermis. Beta particles are able to penetrate the outer layers of the skin and reach the basal layer, giving a localized dose to the skin when contact is high. Gamma emitters are the most dangerous as gamma radiation can penetrate into internal organs, depending on the energy of the gamma radiation. However, although alpha particles cannot penetrate the epidermis, they are extremely hazardous when taken into the body. Alpha particles that are emitted within the body deposit energy more densely than either beta particles or gamma radiation and are consequently more destructive. Cycle of depleted uranium inside the human body [10,18,21] Internal contamination with depleted uranium occurs through inhalation or ingestion of depleted uranium particles. Once inhaled, very small insoluble particles of uranium oxide (2.5 mm or less in diameter) can reside in the lungs for years, slowly passing through the lung tissue into the blood. As a result of coughing and other involuntary mechanisms by which the body keeps large particles out of the lungs, the larger particles pass through the gastrointestinal tract. Around 0.2% of insoluble depleted uranium and 2.0% of the soluble depleted uranium taken in food and water are absorbed by the gut. Over 95% of the depleted uranium entering the body is not absorbed but is eliminated via the faeces. Of the depleted uranium that is absorbed into the blood, approximately 67% will be filtered by the kidneys and be excreted in the urine within 24 hours, increasing to 90% within a few days. The unexcreted depleted uranium is distributed around the body and stored in bones, kidneys, liver and other tissues. Health effects of depleted uranium [17�26] The human body has no way of protecting itself from depleted uranium in water, food or air. External exposure to depleted uranium leads to radiological toxicity, while the effects of internal contamination with depleted uranium are complex, caused by both chemical and radiological mechanisms. The detailed mechanism of radiation toxicity is a subject of continuing research. However, it is thought that one of the ways in which the deposited energy may damage cells is by causing changes in deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), a biologically important molecule that controls all aspects of structure and function and which is mainly found in cell nuclei. Two types of health effects have been demonstrated: deterministic and stochastic. The deterministic effects depend on the dose of radiation. Massive exposure can lead to death within a few days or weeks. Lower doses cause burns, erythema, loss of hair or other effects on the skin. The primary stochastic effect associated with radiation exposure is cancer. Radiation causes direct damage to cell DNA. The damaged cells that die, as long as they are not too many, are not a real problem, but the damaged cells that survive may reproduce in an abnormal and uncontrolled fashion, becoming cancer cells. As the cancer spreads, it destroys the healthy tissue and unless treated it eventually kills the host. Cancers of all kinds can result from internal radiation exposure, depending on the organ affected. In the case of inhalation of insoluble depleted uranium particles, the upper aerodigestive tract and the lungs are the first target organs, in which case tissue damage and an increased probability of cancers is these areas would be expected. The bone is one of the main places where depleted uranium is stored, leading to uncontrolled production of white blood cells to the detriment of other cells, ultimately leading to leukaemia. It takes many years for a cancer caused by contaminated air, food or water to grow, so the effect is not apparent immediately. Exposure to radiation can also affect the reproductive system, causing infertility or damage to the father�s sperm or mother�s egg. Genetic damage is possible, leading to spontaneous abortion, premature death or congenital anomalies. Some forms of genetic damage are not seen in the first or second generations but only later after several generations have passed. Another danger of exposure to low-dose radiation is biological damage in the form of monocyte depletion, leading to iron deficiency anaemia and a depressed cellular immune system. Radiation also deforms red blood cells, inhibiting their passage into the tiny capillaries and depriving the muscles and brain of adequate oxygen and nutrients. This can lead to impairment of many organs especially the kidneys, liver, lungs and cardiovascular and haematopoietic systems. Radiation can cause disorders of protein and carbohydrate metabolism, leading to symptoms ranging from severe headache to brain dysfunction. Mental retardation owing to brain damage of the fetus has also been described as a result of radiation exposure in the womb during the critical period when the child�s brain is being formed. The chemical toxicity of depleted uranium results from its interaction with the biochemical processes of the human body. Chemically, depleted uranium damages kidney function in humans. The proximal tubules are the main site of potential damage. The types of damage that have been observed are nodular changes to the surface of the kidney, lesions to the tubular epithelium and increased levels of glucose and protein in the urine. Conclusion If depleted uranium were indeed used in the Gulf War, it will certainly have constituted an enormous health hazard not only to the US and European veterans deployed in the region during the war but also to the residents of the war countries and surrounding areas. The extent of the region affected has not been determined and the long-term dangers remain unidentified. (Update � January 2006: Regions of affected areas since 1988 are � Bosnia, Kosovo, Yugoslavia, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, parts of Syria and those areas where DU is stored before and after use. All updated reports, including medical, contain information identifying products, materials, human populations, military personnel and their families.) Many issues concerning this subject need to be resolved through extensive public health action and intense epidemiological research. But first everyone needs to be informed and/or educated as to what it is they are actually dealing with before they can proceed with or for any efforts to be effective. References 1. Bertell R. Gulf War veterans and depleted uranium. Paper prepared for the Hague Peace Conference 11�15 May 1999. 2. Mathews J. Radioactive bullets raise cancer fears. Journal of the National Cancer Institute, 1993, 85(13):1029�30. 3. McDiarmid MA et al. Health effects of depleted uranium on exposed Gulf War veterans. Environmental research, 2000, 82(2):168�80. 4. Hooper FJ et al. Elevated urine uranium excretion by soldiers with retained uranium shrapnel. Health physics, 1999, 77(5):512�9. 5. Beers MH, Berkow R, Burs M, eds. The Merck manual, 17th ed. Rathway, New Jersey, Merck & Co, 1999:2480. 6. Jamal GA. Gulf War syndrome: a model for the complexity of biological and environmental interaction with human health. Adverse drug reactions and toxicological reviews, 1998, 17(1):1�17. 7. Nicolson GL, Nicolson NL. The eight myths of Operation �Desert Storm� and Gulf War syndrome. Medicine, conflict, and survival, 1997, 13(2):140�6. 8. Steele L. Prevalence and patterns of Gulf War illness in Kansas veterans: association of symptoms with characteristics of person, place, and time of military service. American journal of epidemiology, 2000, 152(10):992�1002. 9. Knoke JD, Gray GC, Garland FC. Testicular cancer and Persian Gulf War service. Epidemiology, 1998, 9(6):648�53. 10. Durakovic A. Medical effects of internal contamination with uranium. Croatian medical journal, 1999, 40(1):49�66. 11. Doyle P, Roman E, Maconochie N. Birth defects among children of Gulf War Veterans. New England journal of medicine, 1997, 337(16):1175�6. 12. Araneta MR et al. Goldenhar syndrome among infants born in military hospitals to Gulf War veterans. Teratology, 1997, 56(4):244�51. 13. Haley RW et al. Brain abnormalities in Gulf War syndrome: evaluation with 1H MR spectroscopy. Radiology, 2000, 215(3):807�17. 14. Cannova JV. Multiple giant cell tumors with Gulf War syndrome. Military medicine, 1998, 163(3):184�5. 15. Rajab KE, Mohammad AM, Mustafa F. Incidence of spontaneous abortion in Bahrain before and after the Gulf War of 1991. International journal of gynae-cology and obstetrics, 2000, 68(2):139�44. 16. Ascherio A et al. Effect of the Gulf War on infant and child mortality in Iraq. New England journal of medicine, 1992, 327 (13):931�6. 17. Makhseed M et al. Post-war changes in the outcome of pregnancy in Maternity Hospital, Kuwait. Medicine, conflict, and survival, 1996, 12(2):154�67. 18. Edwards G. Uranium: known facts and hidden dangers. World uranium hearings. Salzburg, Austria, September 14, 1992. 19. Depleted uranium. Geneva, World Health Organization, 2001 (Fact sheet no. 257). 20. Depleted uranium: sources, exposure and health effects. Geneva, World Health Organization, 2001. 21. Fresquez PR et al. The uptake of radionuclides by beans, squash, and corn growing in contaminated alluvial soils at Los Alamos Laboratory. Journal of environmental science and health. Part B, 1998, 33(1):99�121. 22. Wedeen RP. Renal diseases of occupational origin. Occupational medicine, 1992, 7(3):449�63. 23. Bertell R. Internal bone seeking radionuclides and monocyte counts. International perspectives in public health, 1993, 9:21�6. 24. Bertell R, ed. Handbook for estimating health effects from exposure to ionizing radiation, 2nd ed. Buffalo, New York, Institute of Concern for Public Health, 1986. 25. Sources, effects and risks of ionizing radiation. New York, United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, 1998. 26. Ritz B et al. The effects of internal radiation exposure on cancer mortality in nuclear workers at Rocketdyne/Atomics International. Environmental health perspectives, 2000, 108(8):743�51. A Process for Reducing the Licensing Burden for New Products Containing Depleted Uranium Citation ANL/EAD/TM/03-01 Authors Ranek, Nancy L.; Kamboj, Sunita; Hartmann, Heidi M.; Avci, Halil I. Document Type TM Publication Year 2003 (New Products containing Depleted Uranium? Like what - bumpers on our cars; window and door frames in our houses; lunch-boxes for our kids?) Avoiding Destructive Remediation at DOE Sites Whicker, F.W.; MacDonell, Margaret M.; Hinton, T.G.; Pinder, III, J.E.; Habegger, Loren J. Development of an Analytical Methodology for Sarin (GB) and Soman (GD) in Various Military-Related Wastes O'Neill, Hugh J.; Brubaker, Kenneth L.; Schneider, John F.; Sytsma, Louis F.; Kimmell, Todd A. Discrete Charm of Cooperative Federalism: Environmental Citizen Suits in the Balance, The Puder, Markus Environmental Policy and Regulatory Constraints to Natural Gas Production Elcock, Deborah Final Environmental Impact Statement for Construction of a Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Facility at the Portsmouth, Ohio, Site Life-Cycle Evaluation of Alternative Configurations for Shipping Low-Level Radioactive Waste to the Nevada Test Site Daling, P.M.; Biwer, Bruce M.; Siebach, Peter R.; Ross, Steven B. Measurement Uncertainties and Minimum Detectable Concentrations for the In Situ Nal Gamma Spectroscopy Systems Used at Fernald Davis, Michael J. (EA) Modeling the Suitability of Potential Wetland Mitigation Sites with a Geographic Information System Van Lonkhuyzen, Robert A.; LaGory, Kirk E.; Kuiper, James A. Process for Reducing the Licensing Burden for New Products Containing Depleted Uranium, A Ranek, Nancy L.; Kamboj, Sunita; Hartmann, Heidi M.; Avci, Halil I. Voluntary Cleanup of the Ames Chemical Disposal Site Taboas, Anibal L.; Freeman, Richard; Peterson, John M. Environmental Research Division Publications, 1999-2005 Discounted Casualties The Human Cost of Depleted Uranium Fabrication, Assembly, R & D, Test Firing, Storage and Demilitarization Sites involving DU Ammunition in USA [Source: US Army Environmental Policy Institute Technical Report (June 1995) ] Fabrication and Assembly Sites 1 Aerojet Ordnance Company Chino, California 2 Aerojet Ordnance Tennessee Jonesboro, Tennessee 3 Detroit Army Tank Plant Warren, Michigan 4 Lima Army Tank Plant Lima, Ohio 5 Martin Marrietta Energy Systems Milan Army Ammunition Plant Milan, Tennessee 6 Mason and Hanger at Iowa Army Ammunition Plant Middletown, Iowa 7 National Manufacturing Corporation St. Louis, Missouri 8 Starmet Corporation, formerly known as Nuclear Metals, Inc. Concord, Massachusetts 9 Olin Ordnance Corporation Red Lion, Pennsylvania 10 Specific Manufacturing Capability Facility Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Idaho Falls, Idaho 11 Tank Automotive Command Warren, Michigan 12 Twin Cities Army Ammunition Plant, Alliant Tech Systems New Brighton, Minnesota 13 White Sands Missile Range Green River, Utah 14 White Sands Missile Range White Sands, New Mexico R & D and Test Firing Sites 15 Army Research Laboratory APG, Maryland 16 Battelle Pacific Northwest Labs Richland, Washington 17 Energetic Materials Research and Technology Center, formerly known as the Terminal Effects Research and Analysis(TERA) facility Socorro, New Mexico 18 Ethan Allen Firing Range (General Electric) Burlington, Vermont 19 Jefferson Proving Ground Madison, Indiana 20 Los Alamos National Laboratory Los Alamos, New Mexico 21 Manufacturing Sciences Corp. Oak Ridge, Tennessee 22 Nevada Test Site Mercury, Nevada 23 Picatinny Arsenal Dover, New Jersey 24 Sandia National Laboratories Albuquerque, New Mexico 25 Tonopah Test Range Tonopah, Nevada 26 US Army Combat Systems Test Activity APG, Maryland 27 Yuma Proving Ground Yuma, Arizona Storage and Storage/Demilitarization Sites 28 Defense Consolidation Facility Snelling, South Carolina 29 Hawthorne Army Ammunition Plant Hawthorne, Nevada 30 Hunter Army Airfield Savanna, Georgia 31 Letterkenny Army Depot Chambersberg, Pennsylvania 32 McAlester Army Ammunition Plant McAlester, Oklahoma 33 Savanna Army Depot Savanna, Illinois 34 Seneca Army Depot Activity Romulus, New York 35 Sierra Army Depot Herlong, California 36 Tooele Army Depot Tooele, Utah 37 US Army Armament Munitions and Chemical Command Rock Island, Illinois 38 Watervliet Arsenal Albany, New York Processing Sites 39 Carolina Metals Barnwell, South Carolina 40 Sequoyah Fuels Corporation Gore, Oklahoma Waste Disposal Sites 41 Chem-Nuclear Systems Waste Management Facility Barnwell, South Carolina 42 Envirocare of Utah, Inc. Clive, Utah 43 US Ecology Hanford, Washington Former DU Use or Storage Sites, and Sites Being Decommissioned 44 Alliant Tech Systems, Inc. Elk river, Minnesota 45 Army Research Laboratory Watertown, Massachusetts 46 Camp Roberts Military Reservation Bradley, California 47 Chamberlain Manufacturing Waterloo, Iowa 48 China Lake Naval Weapons Center Alliant Tech Systems Ridgecrest, California 49 Ford Aerospace and Communications Corp. San Juan Capistrano, California 50 Fort Hood Killeen, Texas 51 Fort Riley Junction City, Kansas 52 Fort Stewart Hinesville, Georgia 53 Lake City Army Ammunition Plant Independence, Missouri 54 National Lead Industries Colonie, New York Other 55 Nellis Air Force Firing Range *Not mentioned in the Army Technical Report, but still in use Nevada

State of Nevada Review Comments Draft Environmental Assessment Resumption of Use of Depleted Uranium Rounds at Nellis Air Force Range Target 63-10

Carson City, Nevada  September 15, 1997

September 15, 1997

Colonel Michael F. Fukey
Director, Environmental Management
Department of the Air Force
Headquarters, 99th Air Base Wing
Nellis Air Force Base, NV 89191-7007

RE: SAI # E1997-160: Draft Environmental Assessment of Resumption of Use of Depleted Uranium Rounds at Nellis Air Force Range Target 63-10

Dear Colonel Fukey:

   Thank you for granting the State of Nevada an extension of the comment period for the above referenced Draft Environmental Assessment (EA). We also appreciated the Air Force's prompt response to our request for the supplemental materials incorporated by reference in the Draft EA.

General Comments:
   Our review of the Draft EA and accompanying materials suggest that the environmental effects that could be anticipated from the resumption of air-to-ground firing of depleted uranium (DU) munitions have not been adequately assessed. There are two central reasons for this opinion. First, neither the Draft EA nor its predecessor, the Limited Site Assessment, reflect awareness of the scant scientific and technical information on the use of DU and the large uncertainties that characterizes the issue of using DU munitions in the environment. For example, the Draft EA cites the study involving the Yuma Proving Grounds (YPG), LA-13156-MS, September 1996, but fails to capture the large degree of uncertainty about the impact of DU in the environment.

   The YPG investigation included an extensive and detailed review of the scientific information available and attempted to construct an environmental transport mechanism for DU as a means of evaluating the risks that environmental DU poses to ecosystems and to humans. This proved to be impossible because of insufficient data and an incomplete understanding of DU in the environment. Thus, the conclusions from the YPG study were based on unsubstantiated conjecture. This should be reflected in the Draft EA.

   Additionally, the Draft EA should note that the YPG study found DU residues in all components of the environment, that environmental concentrations varied widely, that corroded DU residues are soluble and mobile in water, that wind dispersal during testing is the prevalent means of dispersal of DU particles, and that an unknown degree of risk was posed to human health by DU in the environment. Moreover, there appears to be no insight into the issue of long-term (100 to 1,000 years and longer) environmental threats posed by DU residues. The study concluded by identifying the environmental field and laboratory studies needed to provide a credible assessment of the risks to both ecosystems and humans from environmental DU. This information should also be reflected in the Draft EA.

   The second reason for our conclusion that the Draft EA is inadequate is based on a lack of attention by the Air Force to implementing a comprehensive monitoring program to assess DU airborne emissions and/or transport of DU particulates in surface and groundwater at Target 63-10. The necessity of doing so was one of the most obvious and strong conclusions from the YPG study. Accordingly, an on-site monitoring program for Target 63-10 should be initiated before a responsible assessment can be conducted of the potential for short and long-term effects on humans and ecosystems from transport and corrosion of DU in the environment. Likewise, wind dispersal of dust containing DU generated from air-to-ground firing is a probable transport mechanism of concern¹, one that must be considered in developing a monitoring program for the target area.

   While the Air Force has prepared a brief DU management plan for the range in question, this plan has not been publicly reviewed and appears to fall short of achieving a comprehensive monitoring program to document the possible migration of DU from the target area. Elements of the proposed program apparently have not been initiated even though the Air Force wishes to resume the use of DU munitions at Target 63-10.

   As mentioned above, the Draft EA relies on studies conducted at the Yuma Proving Grounds in Arizona to suggest that no impacts would occur from firing DU munitions at Target 63-10. The EA states that "the general results of this evaluation (at Yuma) should be similar to NAFR Range 63 conditions." In addition, the proposed Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) for the Draft EA says that airborne emissions of DU particulates "would settle quickly resulting in minimal air migration." Yet the Draft EA provides no factual evidence, through either on-site monitoring or modeling, to substantiate that dispersal of DU would in fact be minimal and contained to the vicinity of the target area. The document simply states that "air migration of DU particulates is not likely to occur at any great distance due to the extreme density of these particulates and the oxides." The term "great distance" is not quantified. And as mentioned above, an assessment of wind dispersal of dust containing DU that is generated by direct air-to-ground firing has not been performed.

   In a related matter, the Draft EA acknowledged that the nearest population center to the range is Indian Springs, located 12 miles southwest of the target. However, the document fails to mention that a major state institution, the Southern Desert Corrections Center, (with an inmate population of over 1,400 ), is located in the same general vicinity and is likely to be closer to the target than the community of Indian Springs.

   The Draft EA also failed to present, or assess, disposition alternatives for hazardous materials ² and DU wastes. This is a significant issue given the Air Force's failure to provide specific information on the physical forms and probable locations of the estimated 27,000 kilograms (30 tons) of DU that has already been deposited in the target area and on target vehicles. If the preferred alternative is adopted, this volume of contamination would be expanded by an estimated 2,370 kilograms, or 2.6 tons of DU per year.

   Accordingly, by not assessing the "cradle to grave" management of existing and expected to be generated DU materials and soil contamination, the EA is deficient in scope, in terms of compliance with Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations for defining the "range of actions, alternatives and impacts to be considered" (CFR Parts 1508.25). Moreover, the EA provides little or no information about the management plans, alternatives, and potential hazards concerning disposition of the 200 plus contaminated vehicles that remain in the range holding area; the same can be said for the disposition of thousands of cubic meters of permanently contaminated soil that currently exists [and would be significantly expanded] at Target 63-10.

Recommendations:
   The State's review of the document suggests that the Air Force should not implement the draft Finding Of No Significant Impact for the referenced EA.

   Alternatively, if Target 63-10 is to be used for DU test and training activities, then a detailed Environmental Radiological Monitoring (ERM) program (i.e., risk assessment/DU transport model) should be developed, peer reviewed, and implemented for actual site conditions in the Three Lakes Valley region of the Desert National Wildlife Range. Development of a comprehensive ERM program should proceed any action by the Air Force to resume DU air-to-ground test and training activities at Range 63-10.

   The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review process should also be reinitiated to cover the full scope of issues associated with the management, use, and final disposition of DU munitions. As currently written, the Draft EA is silent on the final disposition of DU contaminated targets and soils. And this is clearly inappropriate, given the volume of legacy waste (i.e., expended military ordnance) that exists today on public lands throughout the west. If the Air Force fails to address final disposition of these wastes in a revised EA, then such an analysis must be presented in the Nellis Range Renewal EIS.

   Finally, the long-term use of DU munitions on the Desert National Wildlife Range appears to be an incompatible activity. To address this issue, the Air Force and the Department of Interior should assess options for land exchanges through appropriate legislative initiatives such as the Nellis Range Renewal process stipulated under P.L. 99-606.

Please contact me if you have any questions about these comments. Sincerely,
 
 

Julie Butler, Coordinator
Nevada State Clearinghouse

JB/jbw
cc:
Richard Urey & Tim Crowley, Governor's Office
Robert R. Loux, NWPO
Lew Dodgion, NDEP
Leo Penne, Washington Office
Michael Wickersham, NDOW
John B. Walker, NWPO
Charles Malone, NWPO
Paul Liebendorfer, NDEP
Karen Beckley, NDEP
Les Monroe, DOE
Ken Voget, USFWS, Las Vegas
Mike Dwyer & Brian Amme, BLM,
Connie Lewis, The Keystone Center
Michele Leslie, The Nature Conservancy
 
 

FOOTNOTES

¹  Ebinger, M.K. et. al., "Long Term Fate of Depleted Uranium at Aberdeen and Yuma Proving Grounds, Phase II: Human Health and Ecological Risk Assessment." September 1996, Los Alamos National Laboratory, (see page 115).

2  The EA is silent about the potential historical generations of mixed waste, as well as the potential generation of mixed waste from future activities on the referenced range.
 
 

Depleted Uranium - The Toxic Killer
By: Mick Youther
Department of Physiology
Southern Illinois University - Carbondale, Illinois

The Bush Administration knows about the health and the environmental consequences of using depleted uranium but it doesn't care.

When I first heard the term �depleted uranium�, I thought it must be uranium after the radioactivity was gone. I was wrong.

� �Depleted uranium (DU) is the highly toxic and radioactive byproduct of the uranium enrichment process.... Depleted uranium is roughly 60% as radioactive as naturally occurring uranium, and has a half life of 4.5 billion years. As a result of 50 years of enriching uranium for use in nuclear weapons and reactors, the U.S. has in excess of 1.1 billion pounds of DU waste material.�-- Dan Fahey, �Metal of Dishonor� (1997)

� �More ordinance was rained down on Iraq during the six weeks of the Gulf War than during the whole of the Second World War. Unknown to the public or the Allied troops at the time, much of it was coated with depleted uranium (DU)�-- Felicity Arbuthnot, New Internationalist, September 1999

� �The Pentagon and the United Nations estimate that the U.S. and Britain used 1,100 to 2,200 tons of armor-piercing shells made of depleted uranium during attacks on Iraq in March and April [2003]--far more than the 375 tons used in the 1991 Gulf War.�-- Seattle Post Intelligencer, 8/4/03

� �Since the U.S. military's widespread use of DU in the Gulf became known in 1991, the Pentagon has struggled to suppress mounting evidence that DU munitions are simply too toxic to use. It has cashiered or attempted to discredit its own experts, ignored their advice, impeded scientific research into DU's health effects and assembled a disinformation campaign to confuse the issue.�-- Environmental Magazine, May/Jun 2003

� �When I spoke out within the military about how bad [depleted uranium] was, my life ended, my career ended. I received threats, warnings, sent to the reserve from full active duty."-- Dr. Doug Rokke, former Army Major, who was in charge of the military's environmental clean-up following the first Gulf War, ABC News, 5/5/03 (Thirty members of Rokke�s cleanup team have already died, and he has 5,000 times the acceptable level of radiation in his body, resulting in damage to his lungs and kidneys, brain lesions, skin pustules, chronic fatigue, continual wheezing and painful fibromyalgia. After the Gulf War, Rokke was assigned to make a training video to teach soldiers how to handle depleted uranium. It was a never shown to the troops.)

� �...General Calvin Waller told NBC's �Dateline� that neither he nor General Norman Schwartzkopf were ever told about the health hazards of DU.�-- Military Toxics Project's Depleted Uranium Citizens' Network, 1/16/96

� �Military men are dumb, stupid animals to be used as pawns for foreign policy.�-- Henry Kissinger, quoted by Bob Woodward in �The Final Days� (1976)

� �Our studies indicate that more than forty percent of the population around Basra will get cancer. We are living through another Hiroshima�-- Dr. Jawad Al-Ali, an oncologist and member England's Royal Society of Physicians, quoted by islamonline.net, 5/15/03

� �The leukemia rate in Sarajevo, pummeled by American bombs in 1996, has tripled in the last five years. But it's not just the Serbs who are ill and dying. NATO and UN peacekeepers in the region are also coming down with cancer.�-- Baltimore Chronicle, 12/5/01

� �Drought-stricken Afghanistan's underground water supply is now contaminated by these nuclear weapons. Experts with the Uranium Medical Research Center report that urine samples of Afghanis show the highest level of uranium ever recorded in a civilian population.�-- Amy Worthington, Idaho Observer, April 2003

� �By now, half of all the 697,000 U.S. soldiers involved in the 1991 war have reported serious illnesses. According to the American Gulf War Veterans Association, more than 30 percent of these soldiers are chronically ill and are receiving disability benefits from the Veterans Administration.�-- Sara Flounders and John Catalinotto, Swans Commentary, 2/2/04

� �Gulf War Syndrome not only killed, maimed, and made soldiers sick, they brought it home. In a study of 251 Gulf War veterans' families in Mississippi, 67 percent of their children were born without eyes, ears or a brain, had fused fingers, blood infections, respiratory problems or thyroid and other organ malformations.�-- Leuren Moret, environmental geologist, San Francisco Bay View, 11/7/01

� �In America, war means money - lots of it - and to the corporations which profit from war, our soldiers are nothing more than an expendable item. The Pentagon and the military corporations clearly consider contamination of their own soldiers as an acceptable cost.�-- S.R. Shearer, The End Times Network, 5/10/99

How can we do this to our soldiers, their families and the other victims of war? How can anyone think this is a good idea?

Mick Youther is an Instructor in the Department of Physiology at Southern Illinois University in Carbondale, IL.
You can email your comments to:
Mick@interventionmag.com

Depleted Uranium - The Planet Killer
Depleted Uranium Kills!

by mAd rEpoSteR Monday April 04, 2005 at 09:30 PM

Depleted Uranium has been linked to "Gulf War Syndrome".

US 'Depleted' Uranium Death Toll From Iraq Now at 11,000

Nationwide Media Blackout Keeps US Public Ignorant About This Important Story

By James P. Tucker Jr.
American Free Press.net
4-4-05

The death toll from the highly toxic weapons component known as depleted uranium (DU) has reached 11,000 soldiers and the growing scandal may be the reason behind Anthony Principi's departure as secretary of the Veterans Affairs Department.

This view was expressed by Arthur Bernklau, executive director of Veterans for Constitutional Law in New York, writing in Preventive Psychiatry E-Newsletter.

"The real reason for Mr. Principi's departure was really never given," Bernklau said. "However, a special report published by eminent scientist Leuren Moret naming depleted uranium as the definitive cause of 'Gulf War Syndrome' has fed a growing scandal about the continued use of uranium munitions by the U.S. military."

The "malady [from DU] that thousands of our military have suffered and died from has finally been identified as the cause of this sickness, eliminating the guessing. . . . The terrible truth is now being revealed," Bernklau said.

Of the 580,400 soldiers who served in Gulf War I, 11,000 are now dead, he said. By the year 2000, there were 325,000 on permanent medical disability. More than a decade later, more than half (56 percent) who served in Gulf War I have permanent medical problems. The disability rate for veterans of the world wars of the last century was 5 percent, rising to 10 percent in Vietnam.

"The VA secretary was aware of this fact as far back as 2000," Bernklau said. "He and the Bush administration have been hiding these facts, but now, thanks to Moret's report, it is far too big to hide or to cover up."

Terry Johnson, public affairs specialist at the VA, recently reported that veterans of both Persian Gulf wars now on disability total 518,739, Bernklau said.

"The long-term effect of DU is a virtual death sentence," Bernklau said. "Marion Fulk, a nuclear chemist, who retired from the Lawrence Livermore Nuclear Weapons Lab, and was also involved in the Manhattan Project, interprets the new and rapid malignancies in the soldiers [from the second war] as 'spectacular' - and a matter of concern."

While this important story appeared in a Washington newspaper and the wire services, it did not receive national exposure"a compelling sign that the American public is being kept in the dark about the terrible effects of this toxic weapon.

(Veterans for Constitutional Law can be reached at (516) 474-4261.)

DU Death Toll

Article from: The Las Vegas Indymedia Center
The Las Vegas Indymedia Center is a non-commercial, democratic collective of Las Vegas independent media makers and media outlets, and serves as the local organizing unit of the global Indymedia Network.

Nuke Dump Gets Closer to Reality

Thursday, February 24, 2005, Skull Valley:

According to a press release recently issued from the Shundahai Network , the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board which is an independent arm of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), issued a decision in favor of the Private Fuel Storage (PFS) facility.

PFS is a consortium of eight electric utilities/commercial power companies/nuclear power plants that claim to have partnered with the Skull Valley Band of the Goshute Native American Tribe. The PFS consortium is interested in storing some 40,000 metric tons of high level radioactive waste in an above ground "temporary" storage repository right in the middle of Utah, in Skull Valley.

The PFS consortium is claiming that it's temporary because they're waiting for the Yucca Mountain Project to be finalized and for the waste to eventually be moved there. This decision empowers the NRC five-member board to make the final licensing decision regarding PFS.

Read and sign onto the letter opposing PFS HERE

(12-2009: The above proposal failed.)

SPECIAL REPORT - Depleted Uranium

Depleted Uranium
http://www.chugoku-np.co.jp/abom/uran/shisetsu_us_e/

Facilities related to radioactive depleted uranium weapons are scattered over virtually the entire United States. The total number of facilities for R&D, manufacture, test firing, storage, and disposal of DU, including those that have been shut down due to radioactive contamination, is upwards of 50. They are far smaller in size and number than the nuclear weapons facilities spread across the country, but like the testing ranges and disposal sites for the latter, they end up in sparsely populated areas, where they contaminate the environment and threaten the health of local residents.

The map shows the locations of DU munitions facilities on a list compiled by the Army Environmental Policy Institute (AEPI) in 1995. I will report on contamination issues related to these facilities, particularly the firing ranges.

Pyramid Lake lies downwind of the Sierra Army Depot, where vast amounts of weapons have been destroyed for many years. It is feared that depleted uranium and chemical substances contaminate the Paiute Tribe�s treasured fishing ground. (Paiute Reservation, Pyramid Lake, Nevada)

The main purpose of DU shells is to destroy tanks made of heavy metals. Test firing of DU shells from tanks requires a large firing range; aerial bombing practice from airplanes requires huge desert bases.

Changing perceptions of the government
The Nellis Air Force Base appears to surround the Nevada Nuclear Testing Site. It is the only DU munitions firing site in current use by the Air Force. The base covers 1.25 million hectares (about 4,830 sq. miles). The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) permits DU rounds to be used on the southeast, or the Las Vegas side, of the base. Here, 7,900 rounds of 30mm shells are tested each year.

Unfortunately, the permissible area happens to lie entirely within a national desert wildlife preserve. DU rounds have been test-fired here since the early 1970s, because radioactivity and heavy metal pollution were not considered serious problems until the mid 1980s. However, a US Congress decision required the Air Force to find 44,500 hectares (about 170 sq. miles) for a wildlife preserve in another part of the state to compensate for the land it contaminated in this area.

Grace Potorti (45), executive director of the NGO Rural Alliance for Military Accountability based in Reno, Nevada, explains the change in attitude of the state residents and state government as follows.

"Nevada cooperated with atmospheric nuclear tests at the Nevada Nuclear Testing Site since the beginning of the 1950s. Until the mid-1980s, it welcomed every expansion of military presence. Then things changed. Though the military presence was doing wonders for the economy, the people and the state government began to realize that the damage to the eco-system and the health of the residents from the use of DU and other munitions surpassed the benefits.

1.5 million unexploded shells
Through the Internet, the Alliance exchanges information with grassroots groups located near military bases all around the country. According to Potorti, the great majority of DU firing ranges are located in sparsely populated areas and are embroiled in controversy regarding radioactive contamination.

One of these is the Army's Jefferson Proving Ground (JPG) in southeast Indiana. To demonstrate the power and accuracy of DU rounds, test firings were repeatedly carried out over 22,300 hectares (about 85 sq. miles) between the mid-80s to 1994. The legacy is about 70 tons of DU, shell fragments, and contaminated storage buildings.

Since 1941, JPG has been test-firing various other kinds of weaponry as well-about 1.5 million unexploded rounds were simply abandoned there.

Tremendous clean-up costs
The Department of Defense has decided to close JPG, but closing and returning the base to the state of Indiana requires decontamination. An environmental report on JPG by researchers at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (New Mexico) in 1996 estimated that a total of $7.8 billion would be needed to clean up the DU alone.

Faced with such a mind-boggling figure, the cleanup has bogged down. Until it takes place, wild deer and other animals living in the vicinity of the radiation-contaminated base will absorb depleted uranium through the air and food.

Area residents have long hunted deer for food and pleasure. People who eat that venison will absorb depleted uranium concentrated by the food chain. They can buy safe drinking water, but they cannot escape the dangers of raising cattle, other livestock and crops on contaminated water.

Though the Department of Defense assures the residents that contamination on the base will not affect their health, Potorti says, "People around here are very worried."

Moreover, as seen in communities living near the firing range of the Energetic Materials Research Test Center attached to the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology in Socorro, New Mexico, and the Sierra Army Depot in Herlong, California, the historic homes of native American tribes are being contaminated, and health problems are emerging.

- End of above Report -

AN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION TO RE-EVALUATE RADIOACTIVE WASTE POLICY
http://www.nirs.org/factsheets/reevaluateindcom0697.htm

More than 120 environmental groups, three-dozen federal legislators, governors, and numerous others have endorsed establishment of an independent Presidential Commission to completely review and re-evaluate our nation�s radioactive waste policy. Sen. Richard Bryan has introduced legislation that would establish such a commission.

Background
The current national nuclear waste policy was established in law in the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987. It calls for a permanent high-level radioactive waste dump to be in place at Yucca Mountain, Nevada by 1998. According to nuclear industry promoters, the federal Department of Energy--in other words, the taxpayer--is supposed to take title to this lethal waste and liability for all leaks or accidents. Yucca Mountain has so far cost billions and will not accept waste in 1998. New scientific information increasingly indicates that this site will not provide safe, permanent waste isolation.

Technical problems also plague a new generation of proposed �low-level� radioactive waste dumps. A dozen or so were supposed to be in place, according to federal law, by December 31, 1992. In fact, none were, and as of June 1997, none are. The problem of �disposing� of a billion pounds of �depleted uranium� from uranium enrichment activities remains vexing and unsolved, as does the problem of storage for extremely hazardous radioactive waste created over the past 50 years by our nation�s nuclear weapons complex.

Nonetheless, while federal government production of new atomic waste has slowed (although clean-up of weapons plants may actually create waste), commercial nuclear reactors and associated facilities continue to generate hazardous material, with no permanent solution for its storage in sight.

The Nuclear Industry�s �Solution�
Some nuclear industry proponents regard irradiated fuel as a valuable commodity--something which should be reprocessed or recycled whenever possible. Because this is neither economically nor socially feasible, the industry is now promoting �interim� offsite storage. The nation�s commercial nuclear utilities have engaged in a massive, high priced advertising campaign aimed at creating the appearance of a major crisis. Ads have run in communities where the waste is located with the intent of motivating residents and forcing the Congress to pass legislation that would move irradiated fuel from their reactor sites. Claiming that �interim� offsite storage is the solution to an environmental problem, the real message from the industry was �move it anywhere but get it off our property.�

Legislation currently pending in Congress would place the �interim� storage facility in Nevada on Western Shoshone Lands because of the dubious Yucca Mountain connection. There have been and continue to be schemes targeting other Native American lands. But �interim� storage has run into substantial criticism since it fails to cope with the central issue: what our nation should do with the waste on a more permanent basis, or whether we should generate radioactive materials in the absence of a permanent solution for their storage. In the meantime, radioactive waste for the most part is being stored on-site at nuclear reactors.

Although the nuclear power industry has tried to portray new �low-level� radioactive waste dumps as essential to ensure continued use of nuclear medicine, the vast majority of medical radioactive waste is both small in its amount of radioactivity and is short-lived, making effective storage quite reasonable. Nuclear reactor waste, on the other hand, is both long-lived and is far more dangerous, in some cases lethal. In addition, unlike medical waste, nuclear reactor waste includes such hazardous elements as Plutonium-239, which has a hazardous life of 240,000 years, far beyond the 100-year control period proposed for �low-level� radioactive waste dumps. This raises substantial questions as to whether the current classification scheme for radioactive waste holds scientific credibility, or whether it is merely a convenience to the nuclear industry.

�Interim� storage of high-level waste, and establishment of national or regional �low-level� nuclear waste treatment centers and dumps also raises the specter of widespread transportation of deadly atomic garbage. In January 1995, the State of Nevada and 102 grassroots environmental groups released a study indicating likely transportation routes for high-level waste: these rail and highway routes would affect thousands of communities in 43 states and pass within � mile of 52 million people--all to move the waste to an uncertain future at a temporary dumpsite, with the distinct possibility that the waste may have to move again. �Interim� storage is not a solution for a sound radioactive waste management policy it is simply a stop-gap measure aimed at removing the waste from where it now rests--with the nuclear utilities--in order to give utilities room to make still more nuclear waste--and to transfer the liability for accidents to taxpayers.

An Independent Commission
For these reasons--the lack of a policy that will lead to safe waste isolation and the bankruptcy of current radioactive waste proposals--a groundswell of public opinion is developing in favor of a different approach. It is time to re-examine our nation�s radioactive waste issues and to think about new ways to address this seemingly insoluble problem. One thing is clear: a sound scientific basis, greater technical justification and greater public acceptance are prerequisites for developing a meaningful radioactive waste storage policy. This cannot be achieved by stop-gap measures endorsed only by nuclear utilities. Legislation that would create an independent Presidential Commission to re-evaluate our nation�s atomic waste policies and to make recommendations that would point the way toward a more sensible and safer means of handling these unwanted byproducts of the nuclear age.

The Commission would consist of recognized scientists; of representatives from state government agencies charged with addressing this problem; of members of affected and potentially-affected communities; of Native American tribes; and, in recognition of the essential role played by ordinary citizens, ordinary citizens. In short, the Commission would resemble our nation itself. It would grapple with this most difficult of issues, and attempt to reach a defensible consensus. During the two-year charter of the Commission, no federal licenses could be issued for radioactive waste storage, except for temporary on-site storage (most �low-level� radioactive waste dumps are licensed by the states).

The concept of an independent Presidential Commission is gaining increasing momentum as the only sound way to address the fundamental flaws in our current radioactive waste policies. We have learned over the years that it is not possible to simply force radioactive waste dumps on people who don�t want them, and that it is unsound to develop radioactive waste policy that is neither publicly acceptable nor scientifically defensible. An independent commission could go a long way toward restoring public confidence in our governmental institutions and in promulgating radioactive waste policies that make sense for our nation.

For more information, contact the Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS), 1424 16th Street NW, #404, Washington, DC 20036, 202-328-0002; fax: 202-462-2183; e-mail: nirsnet@nirs.org

- End of above Report -

Waste disposal
http://www.uic.com.au/wast.htm

Final disposal of high-level waste is delayed to allow its radioactivity to decay. Forty years after removal from the reactor less than one thousandth of its initial radioactivity remains, and it is much easier to handle. Hence canisters of vitrified waste, or spent fuel assemblies, are stored under water in special ponds, or in dry concrete structures or casks for at least this length of time.

The ultimate disposal of vitrified wastes, or of spent fuel assemblies without reprocessing, requires their isolation from the environment for long periods. The most favored method is burial in dry, stable geological formations some 500 meters deep. Several countries are investigating sites that would be technically and publicly acceptable. The USA is pushing ahead with a repository site in Nevada for all the nation�s spent fuel.

One purpose-built deep geological repository for long-lived nuclear waste is in operation in New Mexico, though this only takes defense wastes.

After being buried for about 1,000 years most of the radioactivity will have decayed. The amount of radioactivity then remaining would be similar to that of the naturally occurring uranium ore from which the fuel originated, though it would be more concentrated.

Layers of protection
Thus, to ensure that no significant environmental releases occur over periods of tens of thousands of years after disposal, a 'multiple barrier' disposal concept is used to immobilize the radioactive elements in high-level (and some intermediate-level) wastes and to isolate them from the biosphere.

The principal barriers are:
Immobilize waste in an insoluble matrix, e.g. borosilicate glass, Synroc (or leave them as uranium oxide fuel pellets - a ceramic)
Seal inside a corrosion-resistant container, e.g. stainless steel
In wet rock: surround containers with bentonite clay to inhibit groundwater movement
Locate deep underground in a stable rock structure
Site the repository in a remote location.

For any of the radioactivity to reach human populations or the environment, all of these barriers would need to be breached before the radioactivity decayed.

What happens in USA?
In USA high-level civil wastes all remain as spent fuel stored at the reactor sites. It is planned to encapsulate these fuel assemblies and dispose of them in an underground engineered repository about 2010, at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. This is the program that has been funded by electricity consumers to US$ 18 billion (i.e. @ 0.1 cent per kWh), of which about US$ 6 billion has been spent.

Depleted uranium has few uses, though with a high density (specific gravity of 18.7) it has found uses in the keels of yachts, aircraft control surface counterweights, anti-tank ammunition and radiation shielding. It is also a potential energy source for particular (fast neutron) reactors.

- End of above Report -

Bibliography: Military Use of Depleted Uranium (DU)
(Last updated 6 Aug 2005)

http://www.wise-uranium.org/dlit.html << Go here for further in-depth details pertaining to the issues listed.

Contents:
Press Articles
General � DU Missile Proving Grounds
1991 Gulf War � 1994/5 Bosnia War � 1999 Kosovo War
See also:
Uranium Toxicity
Bibliography: Radiation Monitoring
Bibliography: Cleanup of Radiation Sites

Press Articles
Eric Hoskins: Making the Desert Glow - U.S. uranium shells used in the gulf war may be killing Iraqi children.
The New York Times , OP-ED, January 21, 1993, page A19
William Arkin: The desert glows - with propaganda

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The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1993
Naima Lefkir-Laffitte, Roland Laffitte: Armes radioactives contre l'� ennemi irakien �

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Le Monde diplomatique, avril 1995, page 22
Gary Cohen: Radioactive Warfare - Radioactive Ammo Lays Them to Waste

.Multinational Monitor, Jan/Feb 1996, Vol.17, Nos.1+2
Bill Mesler: The Pentagon's Radioactive Bullet - An investigative report

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The Nation, October 21, 1996
Bill Mesler: Pentagon Poison: The Great Radioactive Ammo Cover-Up

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The Nation, May 26, 1997
Bill Mesler: The Gulf War's New Casualties - Tales of sickness from the Pentagon's own weaponry, made of depleted uranium

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The Nation, July 14, 1997

General
Depleted Uranium in Urine of Soldiers - WISE Uranium Project FAQ (370k PDF)
The Emergence and Decline of the Debate Over Depleted Uranium Munitions 1991-2004 , by Dan Fahey, 20 June 2004 (132k PDF - posted with permission)
Depleted Uranium: Scientific Basis for Assessing Risk

,
The Nuclear Policy Research Institute (NPRI), July 2003 (549k PDF )
Journal of Environmental Radioactivity

,
Special Issue on Depleted Uranium: Volume 64, Issues 2-3, Pages 87-259 (2003)
SCIENCE OR SCIENCE FICTION? Facts, Myths and Propaganda In the Debate Over Depleted Uranium Weapons , by Dan Fahey, (253k PDF , March 12, 2003, posted with permission)
Fact Sheet: Hazards from depleted uranium produced from reprocessed uranium
(290k PDF , revised March 26, 2003)
Infoblatt: Gefahren von abgereichertem Uran aus Wiederaufarbeitungsuran
(290k PDF - in German , revised March 26, 2003)
Composition of the U.S. DOE Depleted Uranium Inventory (70k PDF )
Uranium Toxicity
The health hazards of depleted uranium munitions, Part I/II

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The Royal Society, London, May 2001 / March 2002
Depleted Uranium: Sources, Exposure and Health Effects

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World Health Organization, Geneva, April 2001
Informationen �ber Uran-Munition (Uran-Geschosse, DU-Munition)


(in German ), Heinz Helmers, Hans-J. Pade, Arbeitsgruppe Physikalische Umweltanalytik, Univ. Oldenburg
Depleted Uranium, Background Information on a Current Topic / Depleted Uranium (abgereichertes Uran) (in German )
by W. Arnold, AC-Laboratorium Spiez , Switzerland, January 2000
Alpha-Strahlung: Strahlenbiologie und Risikobeurteilung by Prof. Horst Kuni (350k PDF , in German )
Review of Radioactivity, Military Use, and Health Effects of Depleted Uranium , by Vladimir S. Zajic, July 1999
Health and Environmental Consequences of Depleted Uranium Use in the U.S.Army: Technical Report. Army Environmental Policy Institute , Atlanta, Georgia 1995, 200+ p.
The Military Toxics Project's Depleted Uranium Citizens' Network: Radioactive Battlefields of the 1990's , The United States Army's Use of Depleted Uranium and its Consequences for Human Health and the Environment, Jan.16, 1996, 8 p.
Hantel, L. W. ; Hopson, J. W. ; Sandstrom, D. J.: Evaluation of depleted-uranium alloys for use in armor-piercing projectiles, Los Alamos National Laboratory, June 1973 (declassified 1995), LA-5238, AFATL-TR-73-61, 78 p.
Elder,J C; Tinkle,M C: Oxidation of depleted uranium penetrators and aerosol dispersal at high temperatures, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory 1980, LA-8610-MS, 53 p.
Mishima,J; Parkhurst,M A; Scherpelz,R I : Potential Behavior of Depleted Uranium Penetrators under Shipping and Bulk Storage Accident Conditions. U.S. DOE (Ed.), PNL-5415, Washington, D.C. 1985, 138 p.
Guidelines for Safe Response to Handling, Storage, and Transportation Accidents Involving Army Tank Munitions or Armor Which Contain Depleted Uranium. (ARMY PUBS.), 28 Sep 1990, 56p, NTIS Order number: TB 9-1300-278ING.
Layton,David W; Armstrong,Anthony Q: Methodological Considerations for Determining Cleanup Limits for Uranium in Treated and Untreated Soils. In: Journal of Soil Contamination, Vol.3 (1994) No.4, p.319-348
Erikson,R L; Hostetler,C J; Divine,J R; Price,K R: Review of the environmental behavior of uranium derived from depleted uranium alloy penetrators. U.S. DOE (Ed.), PNL-7213, 1990, 26 p.
Depleted Uranium - A study of its Uses in the UK and Disposal Issues, R&D Technical Report P3-088/TR, UK Environment Agency , Bristol, ISBN: 1 85705 5241, November 2001

DU Missile Proving Grounds
Report on Environmental Effects at Yuma Proving Ground from Continued Testing of Projectiles Containing Beryllium and Depleted Uranium. U.S. DOE (Ed.), UCID- 21277, Washington, D.C. 1988
Shinn,J H : Environmental Analysis of Metal Particle Dispersion from an Explosive Test at Tonopah Test Range. U.S. DOE (Ed.), UCID-21355, Washington, D.C. 1988, 21 p. Camins,I; Shinn,J H: Analysis of Beryllium and Depleted Uranium: An Overview of Detection Methods in Aerosols and Soils, U.S. DOE (Ed.), UCID-21400, Washington, D.C., 1988, 40 p., Download (4.3 MB)

(PDF format)
Wichner,R P; Khan,A A; Hoegler,J M : Separation of Depleted Uranium Fragments from Gun Test Catchments: Phase 1, Catchments System Evaluation and Separations Methods. U.S. DOE (Ed.), ORNL/TM-11141, Washington, D.C. 1989, 128 p.
Ebinger,M H; Essington,E H; Gladney,E S; Newman,B D; Reynolds,C L: Long-term fate of depleted uranium at Aberdeen and Yuma Proving Grounds. Final report, Phase 1: Geochemical transport and modeling. Progress report. U.S. DOE (Ed.), LA-11790-MS, Washington, D.C. 1990, 37 p.
Ikenberry,T A: Evaluation of the depleted uranium hazard from SRAM II missile testing.; California Coastal Commission meeting (CCC), Santa Barbara, CA (USA), 8-9 Apr 1991. U.S. DOE (Ed.), PNL-SA-19325; CONF-91042571, Washington, D.C. 1991, 28 p. Bernhardt,D E: Depleted Uranium Cleanup Criteria and Associated Risk.
In: Proceedings of the 37th Annual Meeting of the Health Physics Society, Columbus, OH, June 21-25, 1992, CONF-920617, 1992, 13 p.
Environmental assessment for the depleted uranium testing program at the Nevada Test Site by the United States Army Ballistics Research Laboratory. U.S. DOE Nevada Field Office (Ed.), DOE/EA-0398, Las Vegas, NV 1992, 60 p.
Wenstrand,T K; Greene,J: Decontamination of Soils Containing Depleted Uranium Using a Combination of Gravity Separation and Chemical-Extraction Techniques. In: Abstracts of Papers of the American Chemical Society 205 (1993) MAR, p.134-IEC Lloyd,D B; Wichner,R P; Jermyn,H W: Separation of Depleted Uranium Fragments from Gun Test Catchments. Volume 1. Summary and Recommendations. Final report. Sep 88-Dec 92.; Oak Ridge National Lab., TN. (Ed.), ORNL/TM-11141-VOL.1, 1993, 63 p.
Wichner,R P; Khan,A A; Hoegler,J M: Separation of Depleted Uranium Fragments from Gun Test Catchments. Volume 2. Catchments System and Separations Methods. Final report. Sep 88-Dec 92.; Oak Ridge National Lab., TN. (Ed.), ORNL/TM-11141-VOL.2, 1993, 139 p.
Wichner,R P; Bradshaw,W M: Separation of Depleted Uranium Fragments from Gun Test Catchments. Volume 3. Economic Comparison of Depleted Uranium Disposal Options for Elgin AFB Gun Test Facility. Final report. Sep 88-Dec 92.; Oak Ridge National Lab., TN. (Ed.), ORNL/TM-11141-VOL.3, 1993, 80 p.
Khan,A A: Separation of Depleted Uranium Fragments from Gun Test Catchments. Volume 4. Bench-Scale Tests of Separating Depleted Uranium from Sand. Final report. Sep 88-Dec 92. Oak Ridge National Lab., TN. (Ed.), ORNL/TM-11141-VOL.4, 1993, 50 p.
Binger H; Myers,O B; Kennedy,P L; Clements,W H: Depleted uranium risk assessment at Aberdeen Proving Ground; American Defense Preparedness Associates symposium on the environment, Albuquerque, NM (United States), 23-25 Mar 1993. . U.S. DOE (Ed.), LA/UR/93-484; CONF-93031121, Washington, D.C. 1993, 10 p.
Clements,W H; Kennedy,P L; Myers,O B: Ecological risk assessment of depleted uranium in the environment at Aberdeen Proving Ground. Annual report, 1991. Progress report. U.S. DOE (Ed.), LA/SUB-93-76, Washington, D.C. 1993, 32 p.
Becker, N M: Influence of hydraulic and geomorphologic components of a semi-arid watershed on depleted uranium transport, U.S. DOE (Ed.), LA-UR-93-2165, Washington, D.C. 1991, 239 p.
Ebinger,M H; Hansen,W R: Environmental radiation monitoring plan for depleted uranium and beryllium areas, Yuma Proving Ground. U.S. DOE (Ed.), LA/UR/94-1838, Washington, D.C. 1994, 87 p.
Ward,T J; Stevens,K A: Modeling erosion and transport of depleted uranium, Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona

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U.S. DOE (Ed.), LA/SUB/94-167; WRRI286, Washington, D.C. 1994, 86 p.
Ebinger,M H; Hansen,W R: Depleted uranium human health risk assessment, Jefferson Proving Ground, Indiana. U.S. DOE (Ed.), LA/UR/94-1809, Washington, D.C. 1994, 77 p. Mason,C F V; Allander,K S; Bounds,J A; Garner,S E; Walter,K J: Use of the long-range alpha detector (LRAD) for alpha emission surveys at active and inactive firing sites; Waste management '94, Tucson, AZ (United States), 27 Feb - 3 Mar 1994. U.S. DOE (Ed.), LA/UR/94-400; CONF-94022547, Washington, D.C. 1994, 10 p.
Van Etten,D M; Purtymun,W D: Depleted uranium investigation at missile impact sites in White Sands Missile Range. U.S. DOE (Ed.), LA/12675/MS, Washington, D.C. 1994, 49 p.
Vandel,D S; Medina,S M; Weidner,J R: Remediation application strategies for depleted uranium contaminated soils at the US Army Yuma Proving Ground. U.S. DOE (Ed.), EGG-CEE-10883, Washington, D.C. 1994, 221 p.
U.S. NRC: Decommissioning of the Depleted Uranium Impact Area of the Jefferson Proving Ground, Madison, IN. Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement and To Conduct a Scoping Process.
In: Federal Register 60 (1995) (April 10), p.18155-18159
Kennedy,P L; Clements,W H; Myers,O B; Bestgen,H T; Jenkins,D G: Evaluation of depleted uranium in the environment at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland and Yuma Proving Grounds, Arizona. Final report. U.S. DOE (Ed.), LA/SUB/94-173, Washington, D.C. 1995, 211 p.
Becker,N M; Vanta,E B: Hydrologic transport of depleted uranium associated with open air dynamic range testing at Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico, and Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. Major Range and Test Facility Base environmental workshop (5th), Alexandria, VA (United States), 23-25 May 1995. U.S. DOE (Ed.), LA/UR/95-1213, Washington, D.C. 1995, 18 p.
Ebinger,M H; Beckman,R J; Myers,O B; et al.: Long- term fate of depleted uranium at Aberdeen and Yuma Proving Grounds, Phase II: Human health and ecological risk assessments. U.S. DOE, LA-13156-MS, Washington D.C., Sep 1996, 218 p.
Ebinger,M H; Hansen,W R: Depleted uranium risk assessment for Jefferson Proving Ground using data from environmental monitoring and site characterization. Final report. Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States), LA- UR-96-3852, Oct 1996, 79p. Ebinger,M H: Depleted uranium risk assessment for Jefferson Proving Ground: updated risk estimates for human health and ecosystem receptors. Los Alamos National Laboratory, LA-UR-98-5053, Nov 1998, 22 p.
Miller,Mark; Galloway,Robert B.; VanDerpoel,Glenn et al.: Cost-Effective Remediation of Depleted Uranium (DU) at Environmental Restoration Sites, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), Albuquerque, NM, and Livermore, SAND99-2843J, 1999, 5 p.

DU in the 1991 Gulf War
Unresolved Issues Regarding Depleted Uranium And the Health of U.S. Veterans of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom , by Dan Fahey, 24 March 2004 (241k PDF - posted with permission)

Dan Fahey: Don't Look, Don't Find. Gulf War Veterans, the U.S. Government and Depleted Uranium 1990 - 2000 , The Military Toxics Project, March 30, 2000
Steve Fetter and Frank von Hippel, "The Hazard Posed by Depleted-uranium Munitions," Science and Global Security, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1999), pp. 125-161 > Download full text: (161k PDF)
� (161k PDF - alternate URL) � (209k Word 97)
Steve Fetter and Frank von Hippel, "When the Dust Settles," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 55, No. 6 (November/December 1999) pp. 42-45
> Download full text:
(26k PDF) � (46k Word 97) DOD Analysis II, by Dan Fahey, June 29, 1999, 22 p. [An Analysis of the RAND report on Depleted Uranium, see below] > Download full text
(419k PDF ) Fahey, Dan: Case Narrative - Depleted Uranium (DU) Exposures, Swords to Plowshares, Inc., National Gulf War Resource Center, Inc., Military Toxics Project, Inc., 3rd edition, September 20, 1998 > Download full text: "GWVR" (RTF format) � MTP

(PDF format)
Fahey, Dan: The Stone Unturned - A Report on Exposures of Persian Gulf War Veterans and Others to Depleted Uranium Contamination, March, 1997
> View full text (80k, RAMA) � Download full text (WordPerfect)
Bukowski,Grace; Lopez,Damacio A: Uranium Battlefields Home & Abroad. Depleted Uranium Use by the U.S. Department of Defense. Citizen Alert & Rural Alliance for Military Accountability (Ed.), Reno / Carson City, Nevada 1993, 166 p.
> Download PDF
Cortenraad, Ren� : Depleted Uranium - "Agent Orange" of the 1990s?, The use of depleted uranium in armor and armor-piercing projectiles. Technische Universiteit Eindhoven , Faculteit Technische Natuurkunde 1995, 48 p.
Dietz, Leonard A. : Contamination of Persian Gulf War Veterans and Others by Depleted Uranium , Niskayuna 1996
Dan Fahey: Collateral Damage: How U.S. Troops Were Exposed to Depleted Uranium During the Persian Gulf War, Sept.20, 1996 (second edition), 20 p.
(can be obtained from Military Toxics Project )
Warren,David R; Solis,William M; Schladt,Beverly C; Maurer,David C; Herman,Robert W; Musallam,Yasmina T: Operation Desert Storm: Army Not Adequately Prepared to Deal With Depleted Uranium Contamination. U.S. General Accounting Office (Ed.), GAO/NSIAD-93-90, Washington, D.C. 1993, 42 p.
> Download full report (PDF)
Daxon,E G; Musk,J H: Assessment of the Risks from Embedded Fragments of Depleted Uranium. Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Inst. (Ed.), AFRRI/TR-93-1, Bethesda, MD 1993, 20 p. Daxon,E G: Protocol for Monitoring Gulf War Veterans with Embedded Fragments of Depleted Uranium. Technical report. Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Inst. (Ed.), AFRRI/TR-93-2, Bethesda, MD 1993, 24 p.
Ember,Lois: Joint Effort to Test Ailing Persian Gulf War Veterans to Begin Soon.
In: Chemical & Engineering News 72 (1994) 21 (May), p.31-32
Bou-Rabee, Firyal: Estimating the Concentration of Uranium in Some Environmental Samples in Kuwait After the 1991 Gulf War. In: Applied Radiation and Isotopes Vol.46 (1995) No.4, p.217-220
Livengood,D R: Health effects of embedded depleted uranium fragments. Special Publication. Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Inst.
(Ed.), AFRRI/SP-98-3, Bethesda, MD, June 1998, 56 p.
Environmental Exposure Report: Depleted Uranium in the Gulf U.S. Department of Defense, July 1998 N. Harley, E. Foulkes, L. Hilborne et al.: A Review of the Scientific Literature As It Pertains to Gulf War Illnesses: Vol.7, Depleted Uranium , MR-1018/7-OSD, RAND, 1999 (alternate source ) Gulf War Illnesses: Understanding of Health Effects From Depleted Uranium Evolving but Safety Training Needed, GAO/NSIAD-00-70, United States General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Requesters, March 2000, 41 p. > Download full report (363k PDF ) Gulf War and Health: Volume 1. Depleted Uranium, Sarin, Pyridostigmine Bromide, and Vaccines , Committee on Health Effects Associated with Exposures During the Gulf War, Division of Health Promotion and Disease Prevention, 416 pp., ISBN 0-309-07178-X, National Academy Press, Sep 2000 > view online Environmental Exposure Report - Depleted Uranium in the Gulf (II) , Office of the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Gulf War Illnesses, December 13, 2000 Depleted Uranium - Human Exposure Assessment and Health Risk Characterization In Support of the Environmental Exposure Report "Depleted Uranium in the Gulf" of the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Gulf War Illnesses, Medical Readiness and Military Deployments (OSAGWI), OSAGWI LEVELS I, II AND III SCENARIOS, U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (USACHPPM), 15 September 2000

DU in the 1994/1995 Bosnia War
Depleted Uranium in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment, UNEP, March 2003 (PDF ) Report of the Portuguese Scientific Mission to Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina for assessment of radioactive contamination and of the radiological risk due to the use of depleted uranium ammunitions (April 17, 2001)

DU in the 1999 Kosovo War
Untersuchungen zur Gesundheitsgef�hrdung durch Munition mit abgereichertem Uran (DU), U.Oeh, P.Roth, U.Gerstmann, W.Schimmack, W.Szymczak, V.H�llriegl, W.Li, P.Schramel, H.G. Paretzke, GSF-Forschungszentrum f�r Umwelt und Gesundheit , Institut f�r Strahlenschutz, GSF-Bericht 03/05, Neuherberg, Juli 2005, 137 S. > View details Depleted Uranium Environmental and Medical Surveillance in the Balkans , Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) for Gulf War Illnesses, Medical Readiness, and Military Deployments, U.S. Department of Defense, 2001 Depleted Uranium: Environmental and Health Effects in the Gulf War, Bosnia and Kosovo, European Parliament, Directorate-General for Research, Working Paper, Scientific and Technological Options Assessment Series, STOA 100 EN, May 2001, 53 p. > Download full text (497k PDF ) UNEP Final Report: Depleted Uranium in Kosovo - Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment, 2001 (PDF ) Report of the Swiss Members of UNEP-Team, 20 March 2001 (95k PDF ) � German Version UNEP Final Report: Depleted Uranium in Serbia and Montenegro - Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, UNEP 2002 (PDF ) Opinion of the Group of Experts Established According to Article 31 of the Euratom Treaty - Depleted Uranium, 6th March, 2001 (140k PDF ) Report of the Portuguese Scientific Mission to Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina for assessment of radioactive contamination and of the radiological risk due to the use of depleted uranium ammunitions (April 17, 2001) Report of the World Health Organization Depleted Uranium Mission to Kosovo, 22 to 31 January 2001 (12 March 2001, 123k PDF ) A study of uranium excreted in urine An assessment of protective measures taken by the German Army KFOR Contingent Research report prepared by P. Roth, E. Werner, H.G. Paretzke for the Federal Ministry of Defense GSF - National Research Center for Environment and Health, Institute of Radiation Protection, Neuherberg, January 2001, GSF Report 3/01, 36 p. > download full text (English) (300k PDF ) P. Roth, E. Werner, H. G. Paretzke: Untersuchungen zur Uranausscheidung im Urin �berpr�fung von Schutzma�nahmen beim Deutschen Heereskontingent KFOR Forschungsbericht im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums der Verteidigung GSF - Forschungszentrum f�r Umwelt und Gesundheit, Institut f�r Strahlenschutz, Neuherberg, January 2001, GSF-Bericht 3/01, 31 S. > download full text (486k PDF in German ) Theodore E. Liolios: Assessing The Risk from the Depleted Uranium Weapons Used in Operation Allied Force, Science & Global Security, Vol. 8 No. 2 (1999), pp.163-181 > download full text (686k PDF ) UNEP/UNCHS Balkans Task Force (BTF): The potential effects on human health and the environment arising from possible use of depleted uranium during the 1999 Kosovo conflict. A preliminary assessment. 76 p., Geneva, October 1999 > Download full text (589k, PDF format) � alternate source

- End of above Report -

OVERVIEW
This brief report is minor in comparison to a very large deadly scenario being played out by the U.S. Govt. the U.S. Military and the Corporate-Industrial Complex. As usual, with radioactive waste of any kind, there is no safe haven. As these afore groups attempt to patronize the intelligence of American and Native American citizens as well as the citizens throughout the world in regards to safe passage (transportation) and storage, the facts well prove the deceit that falls under the current guise of Homeland Security.

Many sites on the internet that pertain to the issue of DU (Depleted Uranium) and which expose the truth are being blocked and ultimately redirected to worthless sites in an effort to cover up these truths. (As we have mentioned at the beginning of this report). The U.S.G. still targets Native American people and their lands in their ongoing efforts of genocide - no matter how much they choose to deny it. What other countries are being subjected to this as well?

Recent discoveries have uncovered other DU storage facilities throughout the United States. They are in populated areas that should set off alarms to the citizens that they too have been targeted for over forty years by these storage dumps and/or facilities without their knowledge whatsoever. They do not know what is in these yards. Perhaps this targeting was unintentional, but that is doubtful, none-the-less, once these groups became aware of how deadly these materials were they should have halted their storage in such close proximity of human populations at the least. Maybe this is why they have chosen areas such as Nevada�and on Native American lands.

During a multi-tribal environmental conference held in Montana (2008) several representatives from various tribes announced their findings of Depleted Uranium dumps, storage facilities and contamination on their lands. They are highly concerned for their people, their lands, water, soil and wildlife. They should be. Further testing is being conducted as to how far this situation reaches.
The following regions reported are:
Nevada, California, Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, Idaho, Washington and Alaska.

There are probably more.

RRI